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AbStRAct
Phylogenetic systematics (the cladistic analysis of phylogenetic relationships) is not hypothetico-
deductively structured (in the sense of a covering law model of scientific explanation). If it 
were, there would be no reason to call for total evidence, since that requirement is automatically 
satisfied in a deductively structured explanation. Instead, the appeal to the requirement of 
total evidence in phylogenetic systematics indicates that phylogenetic inference is inductively, or 
abductively, structured. The principle of total evidence has been invoked to render inductive 
inference an argument as strong as it can be, but for this to be the case the total evidence must 
also be relevant evidence, i.e., evidence ‘of the right sort’ relative to the state of affairs to be 
explained. Character congruence is a necessary condition for phylogenetic inference, but not 
also a sufficient condition. What is required in addition is the causal grounding of character 
statements in theories of inheritance, development and function.
Keywords: Hempel, Popper, cladistics, hypothetico-deductivism, total evidence, relevant 
evidence.
IntRODuctIOn
‘An Introduction to the Logic of Phylogeny 
Reconstruction’ is how Gaffney (1979) titled his in-
fluential article in which he sketched a hypothetico-
deductive approach to the cladistic analysis of phylo-
genetic relationships. This title, of course, resonated 
Popper’s (1959 [1992]) ‘The Logic of Scientific Dis-
covery’. Gaffney (1979: 104) found in Popper’s phi-
losophy of science a means to eradicate “nonscien-
tific (non-testable) elements” in systematics, such as 
“tradition, stability, authoritarianism”. In a series of 
reviews of books by Popper and on Popper, Platnick 
& Gaffney (1977, 1978a, 1978b) sought to inform 
“systematists about relevant ideas in Popper’s works” 
(Gaffney, 1979: 105). In his influential textbook on 
phylogenetic systematics, Wiley (1981: 20) adopted 
“the hypothetico-deductive approach throughout”, 
while Farris’ (1983) evaluation of cladistic hypotheses 
of phylogenetic relationships in Popperian terms of 
‘degree of corroboration’ and ‘explanatory power’ is 
still widely considered a classic.
Across the Atlantic, Günther (1956) praised 
Hennig (1950) for his ‘empirio-critical’ approach to 
systematics, and building on Hennig he presented 
phylogenetic analysis again in a hypothetico-deduc-
tive form (Günther, 1967). Schmitt (2001: 343) 
praised Hennig for having transformed systematics 
“from a skill or an art to a truly scientific method … 
which justly takes its place in a hypothetico-deduc-
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tively structured science corresponding to the picture 
of science painted by Popper.” The first comprehen-
sive textbook on phylogenetic systematics published 
in Germany again stipulated “a hypothetico-deductive 
method of scientific argumentation” (Ax, 1984: 59), 
and the same continues in more recently published 
German textbooks (Wiesemüller et al., 2003).
Many more references could be added to the 
above bibliography that documents the tenacity with 
which phylogenetic systematists (cladists) defend(ed) 
a hypothetico-deductive form of argumentation for 
their science. In retrospect, this tenacity, which con-
tinues to the present day, seems rather surprising 
(e.g., compare Kluge [1983: vii], who at that time 
“remained unconvinced of the relevance and impor-
tance” of Popper’s hypothetico-deductivism for sys-
tematics with Kluge [2005]). Why surprising? Well, 
Hennig (1974) himself had remarked – in passing 
– that hypothetico-deductivism is not applicable to 
his method of phylogenetic analysis. Secondly, Sober 
(1988) elegantly demonstrated the inapplicability of 
Popper’s falsificationism to phylogenetic inference. 
Hull (1983) had previously already strongly discour-
aged the application of Popper’s ideas about science 
to systematics. And thirdly, philosophers registered 
a gradual demise of Popper’s philosophy of science 
in the 1960ies and 1970ies (e.g., Okasha, 2006: 72; 
Newton-Smith, 2001) already, i.e., at a time before 
cladists made him their patron saint (Hull, 1988). 
There had, indeed, been important philosophical 
criticism of Popper’s falsificationism (e.g., Kuhn, 
1962, 1970, 1974; Putnam, 1974; Newton-Smith, 
1981 [1994]; Worrall, 1989), which cladists chose to 
ignore. For example, Gaffney (1979: 80) cited Kuhn 
(1970) in support of his assessment that systematics 
was in “the first stages” of a scientific revolution, and 
while conceding that “the course of systematics [could 
be] more a problem in the sociology of science than 
the logic of science” (Gaffney, 1979: 79), he neverthe-
less turned to Popper in order to dress up systematics 
as a proper branch of modern science.
There have been several recent publications 
criticizing the application of Popperian falsification-
ism to cladistics (Rieppel, 2003, 2004, 2005; Rieppel 
et al., 2006; Vogt, 2008). The arguments presented in 
these papers need not to be repeated here. In addition, 
Fitzhugh (1997, 2006a, 2006b, 2008) in a series of 
papers analyzed the formal structure of phylogenetic 
inference, arguing that it is neither deductive, nor in-
ductive, but abductive instead. As explained below, 
deduction draws out the conclusion that is logically 
entailed in the premises: it is about what necessarily 
must be the case. Induction concludes from observa-
tion to a generalization: if all the swans I have ever 
seen were white, I might conclude that ‘all swans are 
white’. Inductive generalizations are not necessarily 
true, but only probable, and may be wrong, as when 
black swans are discovered in Austalia. Abduction is 
a form of argument that seeks a causal explanation of 
the data: if in the morning a piece of cheese left on the 
kitchen table shows carvings of little rodent teeth, and 
there are small droppings on the floor, the most likely 
explanation of those observations is that there must 
be a mouse hidden somewhere. An abductive infer-
ence again is only probable and can be wrong: it could 
have been the hamster from the little girl next door 
that had escaped and made his home in the neighbor’s 
kitchen, but that explanation appears (intuitively in 
this example) less parsimonious (see Godfrey-Smith, 
2003, for further discussion).
Fitzhugh (1997, 2006a, 2006b, 2008) used its 
abductive nature to justify both parsimony and the 
requirement for total evidence in phylogenetic infer-
ence. Abduction is also known as ‘inference to the best 
explanation’. Given a certain character distribution 
amongst terminal taxa, the most parsimonious phy-
logenetic hypothesis best explains the data (characters) 
as caused by descent with modification. The doctrine 
of total evidence requires taking into account all avail-
able evidence insofar as it has relevance to an infer-
ence. Fitz-hugh takes the observation of characters as 
evidence, and finds its relevance to derive from the way 
this evidence supports, or contradicts, phylogenetic 
inference under parsimony. In summary, Fitzhugh 
(1997, 2006a, 2006b, 2008) evaluates the relevance of 
the evidence in terms of its congruence or incongru-
ence relative to phylogenetic inference, and roots the 
causal explanation of the relevant evidence in descent, 
with modification (Mayr’s, 1982, ‘ultimate cause’).
Here, I propose to take a somewhat different ap-
proach to the analysis of the claim that cladistics is 
hypothetico-deductively structured and yet tied to the 
requirement for total evidence. Specifically, I want to 
contrast two classic models of scientific explanation, 
the deductive-nomological and the inductive statisti-
cal models to show that the total evidence requirement 
is automatically fulfilled in a hypothetico-deductively 
structured argument. In contrast, consideration of the 
total evidence is non-trivial for inductive or abductive 
reasoning, but again only as far as it is relevant for 
any inference. In contrast to Fitzhugh (1997, 2006a, 
2006b, 2008), I propose to root the relevance of evi-
dence in phylogenetic inference not only in congru-
ence, but also and more fundamentally in theories of 
inheritance, development, and function (the ‘proxi-
mate causes’ of Mayr, 1982).
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DIScuSSIOn
A Matter of Law
In his ‘Logic of Scientific Discovery’, first pub-
lished in 1935, Popper (1959 [1992]) developed a 
certain form of ‘covering law model of scientific expla-
nation’, which was later generalized and more strin-
gently formalized by Hempel & Oppenheim (1948; 
also Hempel, 1965, 1966). Popper’s basic idea was to 
start with the formulation of a law of nature. Popper 
did not consider it an important question how we get 
to the statement of a law of nature in the first place. 
For him, such laws were just stipulated (“invented” in 
Kuhnian terms: Kuhn, 1974: 2). The reason is that 
Popper thought we could never know any such law 
of nature to be true anyway. In contrast, he thought 
we could know them to be false: a law of nature, once 
formulated, could be found to be false. The reason is 
that a law of nature would allow the deduction of a 
sentence that would report on the exemplification of 
that law in nature. If that deduced sentence was found 
to be true, the law was not necessarily true also. But if 
the observation statement deduced from the law was 
found to be false, then the law from which it was de-
duced must be false also.
It is important to notice several, perhaps not 
readily apparent aspects of this Popperian train of 
thought. First of all: deduction is a logical relation. 
Logical relations hold only between sentences (and 
the propositions, or thoughts they express), not be-
tween sentences, or words, and things. If observation 
sentences can be deduced from laws, then laws must 
be sentences also. Laws are not in nature. Natural 
laws cannot be picked up and kicked away. Laws are 
something we say about nature: laws say that nature is 
so-and-so, and what laws say may be right or wrong. 
Nature cannot be right or wrong, it just is.
Similarly then, observation statements (reports, 
sentences) deduced from such laws are likewise some-
thing we say about nature, and again, what they say 
may be true or false. Popper’s first claim to fame was 
his insight that there is no theory-free observation. If 
that is true, there is no theory-independent way of 
knowing whether an observation statement is true or 
false. This particular issue has been subject of much 
discussion, but will not be treated in detail here. Suf-
fice it to say that Popper (1974a) compared the scien-
tific community to a jury in a court of law, and he left 
it up to those jurors and their deliberations to decide 
whether a particular observation report was true or 
false, or whether it should be provisionally accepted 
to be true or false pending further testing.
The other, and in the present context more im-
portant issue, is that these observation statements, 
which are to describe an exemplification of a law in 
natural events or processes, is itself deduced from that 
law. That is how observation statements can test the 
law from which they are deduced. If the observation 
obtains, if the scientific jury decides that the observa-
tion report is true, then that report coheres with the 
law from which it was deduced. In that circumstance, 
Popper saw the law as corroborated. If the natural 
state of affairs described by the observation statement 
does not obtain, if therefore the scientific jury decides 
that the observation statement is false, then the ob-
servation statement logically contradicts the law from 
which it was deduced. The logical law of non-contra-
diction says that of two contradictory propositions, P 
& not-P, only one can be true; one must necessarily be 
false. So if the scientific jury decides that an observa-
tion statement is (to be taken to be) true, and if that 
observation statement contradicts the law from which 
it was deduced, then that law must be false.
However, and importantly: the deduction of an 
observation statement requires that the law, i.e., what 
we say about nature, be said in a particular way. And it 
is also precisely this particular way in which we must 
formulate a law that renders it impossible to know 
such a law to be true, whereas it can be known to be 
false. In order to allow the deduction of observation 
statements, the law must be formulated as a universal 
statement. Accordingly, Popper defined scientific theo-
ries as a set of sentences that must include (at least 
one) universal statement (Stamos, 2007). To be test-
able, a scientific theory, according to Popper, must 
make reference to a universal law of nature.
Such a universal law (theory) of nature is a very 
strong statement about nature. It states that nature 
could not possibly be otherwise than described by 
that law, if the law is true. Universal laws impart ne-
cessity on the natural processes or events that are ex-
plained by such laws. A natural event, or a natural 
process, that is governed by a universal natural law, 
must necessarily obtain in an identical way in all pos-
sible worlds imaginable. There could not be a world 
imaginable in which such an event, or process, could 
fail to obtain, or would obtain differently, given the 
relevant conditions for it to obtain at all. There could 
not be a world imaginable in which such a universal 
law could be suspended. This is what makes deduc-
tion from universal laws possible in the first place, and 
it is also the reason why universal laws can never be 
known to be true.
If an observation statement stands in a logical 
contradiction to the law from which it was deduced, 
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and if that observation statement is judged to be true, 
then the law is falsified. In contrast, if we want to 
know whether a universal law of nature is true, we 
would have to test it, and find it corroborated (con-
firmed), under all imaginable circumstances. But since 
there is an infinity of imaginable worlds, it would take 
an infinite number of tests with positive outcome to 
prove such a law to be true. Since that can never be 
achieved – not just as a matter of practicality, but as a 
matter of principle – we can never know such a uni-
versal law to be true.
It should now have become apparent that there 
cannot be any universal law of nature that governs 
the evolutionary process, as Popper (1974b) indeed 
recognized when he called evolutionary theory a 
‘metaphysical research program’. Take character con-
gruence for example. Many logicians are suspicious 
of definitions, since definitions are arbitrary, or at 
least conventional. They prefer to fix the meaning of 
a term extensionally: the meaning of a term is given 
by all the objects in the world ‘out there’ to which the 
term truthfully applies. The meaning of ‘chordates’, 
for example, is given by the totality of all organisms 
that have a notochord (rather than by a definition). 
The law ‘all chordates are renates’, being a universal 
law, thus states that, necessarily, all organisms that have 
a notochord also have kidneys. According to this law, 
there could be no world imaginable in which organ-
isms existed that have a notochord but no kidneys, 
or vice versa. But evolution is not a process governed 
by necessity. Instead, it is a historically contingent 
process. Perhaps there are historical, or physiological 
reasons that render the existence of a chordate with-
out kidneys unlikely. But it is not impossible to imag-
ine a chordate without kidneys. There is no logical 
contradiction in the statement ‘there exists a chordate 
without kidneys’. ‘All tetrapods have lungs’ is a state-
ment in the form of a universal law. But we know 
that lungless frogs, and salamanders exist. This is what 
Sober (1988) meant when he said that there is no de-
ductive link between a phylogenetic tree (hypothesis) 
and the character distribution on that tree. There is 
no universal law of evolution that governs character 
distribution. Character distribution is historically 
contingent, and the evidence for that fact is character 
incongruence.
the Deductive-nomological Model 
of Scientific Explanation
Why do we need universal laws (i.e., All – state-
ments’) in hypothetico-deductivism? The reason is 
the deductive component of the argument. Deduc-
tion is truth preserving: if it is true that all humans 
are mortal, and if it is true that Socrates is human, 
then it is necessarily also true that Socrates is mortal. 
If the premises are true, there cannot be any world 
imaginable in which Socrates would not be mortal. It 
is impossible to say that Socrates is mortal today, but 
might become immortal tomorrow. For what is true 
today cannot be found false tomorrow. What is found 
false tomorrow must be erroneous today.
Now, a scientist might ask the question: “Why 
is Socrates mortal?” This question specifies the state of 
affairs that the scientist seeks to explain. This is called 
the explanandum in a deductive-nomological argu-
ment. The answer is: “All humans are mortal” and 
(&) “Socrates is human.” ‘All humans are mortal’ is 
the statement of a universal law of nature. ‘Socrates 
is human’ is called an initial condition. It states that 
there exists a thing called Socrates, and that this thing 
is a human being. Combining (logically: conjoining) 
the law statement (L) ‘All humans are mortal’ with the 
initial condition (i) ‘Socrates is human’ explains (is the 
explanans for the explanandum) why Socrates is mor-
tal. The reason is that the conclusion can be deduced 
from the premises. Given the Law (L), and the initial 
condition (i), the explanans (i.e., ‘All humans are mor-
tal’ & ‘Socrates is human’) deductively (logically) en-
tails the explanandum (i.e., ‘Socrates is mortal’). The 
Deductive-Nomological (D-N) model of scientific 
explanation (Hempel & Oppenheim, 1948; Hempel, 
1965, 1966) provides necessary and sufficient condi-
tions for an explanation. If the premises (explanans) 
deductively entail the conclusion (explanandum), 
nothing more is needed for a successful explanation: 
the explanation is said to be complete. But in order 
to deductively entail the explanandum, the explanans 
(the premises) must include (at least one) statement of 
a universal law. If phylogenetic systematics cannot af-
ford a universal law of nature, it cannot be structured 
as a D-N model of explanation.
A scientific explanation along the lines of the 
D-N model, if valid and sound, is complete. In con-
trast, systematists say that phylogeny reconstruction 
is never complete. There is always the possibility – in 
practice, not in principle – to add more characters, and 
more taxa, to an analysis. From there, cladistics ap-
peals to the principle of total evidence (Kluge, 1989). 
But total evidence is not a requirement linked to the 
D-N model of explanation. As long as the explanans 
(the premises) deductively entails the explanandum 
(the conclusion), the explanation is complete. The re-
quirement of total evidence is automatically fulfilled 
in the D-N model of scientific explanation (Salmon, 
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1998; pace Kluge, 2004). Consider the effect of add-
ing initial conditions (i) to the example above:
(L) ‘All humans are mortal’
(i1) ‘Socrates is human’
(i2) ‘Socrates is a man’
(i3) ‘Socrates’ wife is called Xanthippe’
(i4) ‘Socrates has a long beard’
(i5) ‘Socrates despises jewelry’
etc. …
______________________________
Conclusion: ‘Socrates is mortal’
It is easy to see that the statement of the law (L) 
and the first initial condition (i1) are both necessary 
and sufficient to arrive at the conclusion. All other 
premises (initial conditions i2-i5) are irrelevant to the 
explanation as to why Socrates is mortal. The require-
ment of total evidence is automatically fulfilled by (L) 
and (i1).
‘total Evidence’ versus ‘Relevant Evidence’
If phylogenetic (cladistic) inference is hypo-
thetico-deductively structured in the sense of the 
D-N model of scientific explanation1, then there is no 
requirement for total evidence. If there is a require-
ment for total evidence in phylogenetic (cladistic) in-
ference, then that mode of inference is not deductive-
nomologically structured. Since cladists do appeal to 
the requirement of total evidence, cladistic inference 
is inductively, or abductively structured (Fitzhugh, 
1997, 2006a, 2006b, 2008). Indeed, the principle of 
total evidence has originally been invoked in the con-
text of inductive inference (Carnap, 1950; Hempel, 
1962).
Various models of inductive inference have been 
developed over time, which cannot all be mentioned 
here (e.g., see Salmon, 1998). The inductive coun-
terpart to the D-N model is the Inductive-Statisti-
cal (I-S) model of scientific explanation (Hempel & 
Oppenheim, 1948; Hempel, 1965, 1966). It again 
starts from a set of premises, which constitutes the 
explanans that explains the explanandum. However, 
in this case, the explanandum is not logically (deduc-
tively) entailed by the explanans. That is to say, the ex-
planandum (the state of affairs to be explained) does 
not obtain necessarily if the conditions obtain that are 
described by the premises. Instead, the explanandum 
will be expected to obtain with some probability only 
given the premises2. And evidently, the more evidence 
that goes into the premises, the higher will the prob-
ability be for the explanandum to obtain. From this 
follows the requirement for total evidence. But Salm-
on (1998: 364; as also Hempel, 1977) rejected the 
requirement of a high probability for statistical expla-
nation, and requested a “relevance requirement” for 
the evidence instead.
A distinction must therefore be drawn between 
the total evidence, and the total relevant evidence. 
This can be nicely brought out with a paradox of con-
firmation (e.g., Hempel, 1965). Suppose it is a uni-
versal law that ‘all ravens are black’ (technically: ‘for 
all x, if x is a raven, x is black’). If that is true, then it 
must also be true – on grounds of logical equivalence 
– that ‘anything that is not black is not a raven’ (tech-
nically: ‘for all x, if x is not black, x is not a raven’). 
On grounds of logical equivalence one can also trans-
form the first statement into a third one: if something 
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The deductive-nomological model of scientific explanation entails a very strong notion of explanation that appeals to logicians, but 
perhaps not so much to empirical scientists. Indeed, there is good reason to claim that the D-N model is too strong for empirical sciences: 
“many scientific explanations … either do not contain exceptionless laws or do not strictly entail the phenomena” (Lipton, 2004: 26). In 
view of such problems, one might operate with scope restriction for laws. ‘All fishes are infected by XYZ’ is a universal law of unrestricted 
scope that cannot be verified; ‘all fishes in the pond in my back yard are infected by XYZ’ is an ‘all-statement’ of restricted scope, for 
which reason it can be verified, and something can be done about the disease. The problem only is that scope restriction can be practiced 
to a degree that renders the problem to be explained, and its explanation, uninteresting (Kitcher, 1993). Cladists have restricted the scope 
of their hypthetico-deductive argument to the finite universe of a three-taxon statement (e.g., Kluge, 2003). Whereas a hypothetico-
deductive argument scheme can be applied to the logic of a three-taxon statement (Ball, 1982), it is still too strong for cladistic purposes. 
To say that Socrates is mortal because he is human & all humans are mortal, is to say something general about Socrates and all other 
humans. Nothing is said about when, where, and how Socrates will eventually die. But Socrates will eventually die at some point in space 
and time and under some circumstances, which means that the law ‘all humans are mortal’ materially implies that Socrates will eventually 
be dead if he is human. It is this relation of material implication that spoils the hypothetico-deductive reasoning applied to a three-taxon 
statement (see Rieppel et al., 2006, for a detailed discussion). Ball (1982) thought that hypothetico-deductivism could apply to a three-
taxon statement, but because he recognized the strength of the relation of material implication, he had to base this positive conclusion on 
the fact that we can unfallibly recognize which character statements (i.e., observation statements in systematics) are true homologies, and 
which ones are true homoplasies. We know that this is impossible in practice, as it is also impossible in principle, because all observation 
is theory-laden.
There have been attempts to develop a version of the D-N model of explanation that could handle inherently indeterministic (probabilistic) 
processes such as radioactive decay. However, these models are tied to Popper’s famous propensity interpretation of probability, which is 
“notoriously unclear” (Railton, 1978: 222; for further discussion see Rieppel, 2003).
1.
2.
is either a raven, or not a raven, then that thing is 
either not a raven, or it is black (technically: for all 
x, if either x is a raven or x is not a raven, then either 
x is not a raven or x is black’). Given these logical 
permutations of the statement ‘all ravens are black’, 
and maintaining the principle of logical equivalence 
as valid, the conclusion is that any observation of 
anything that is not black – white tennis shoes, green 
leaves, or blue whales – confirms the statement that 
all ravens are black (for further discussion see Ayer, 
1972 [2006]). White tennis shoes, green leaves and 
blue whales could thus be part of the ‘total evidence’ 
that confirms the statement ‘all ravens are black’.
Logicians have discussed and exploited that par-
adox in many different ways, but for biologists this 
whole exercise may seem a bit pointless. Surely there 
is a counterintuitive conclusion here that is rooted in 
logic, but for a biologist, white tennis shoes, green 
leaves, or blue whales are simply irrelevant to the 
question of whether or not it is true that ‘all ravens are 
black’ (see also Lipton, 2004; Salmon, 1998). So here 
again it becomes obvious that the relevant evidence 
has to be distinguished from the total potentially 
available evidence as one proceeds to ponder whether 
it is true hat all ravens are black. We know that the 
reliable observation of a white raven would render 
the statement false, but that is not the question. The 
question is whether a statement such as ‘all ravens are 
black’ can be found to be true, or – if we join Popper 
in saying that this question has no answer – whether 
such a statement can be accepted as one with a high 
probability.
Cladists of the Popperian brand will point out 
that this whole discussion is misguided, or at least has 
no relevance to their research program, for they are 
not interested in the confirmation of a cladogram. 
All that counts is the evaluation of alternative clado-
grams in terms of relative degrees of falsification, and 
complementarily, relative degrees of corroboration 
(e.g., Kluge, 1997a, 1997b). This argument gains 
little purchase, however, as it leads either to extreme 
skepticism, or to closet inductivism. If cladograms are 
evaluated in terms of relative degrees of falsification 
(e.g., Grant & Kluge, 2007), all one does is evaluating 
alternative hypotheses of relationships with respect to 
their falsity content. There is no positive knowledge, 
nothing can be known to be true, everything can only 
be known to be (more or less) false. The result is an 
extreme skepticism. However, Popper linked ‘degree 
of falsification’ with ‘degree of corroboration’. Pop-
per (1979) developed the idea that whereas Newton’s 
theory is highly corroborated, Einstein’s theory earns 
an even higher degree of corroboration because it an-
swers all the questions Newton’s theory answers and 
even more. This idea Popper (1963) developed into 
his concept of verisimilitude that measures the rela-
tive truth content of alternative theories as opposed to 
their relative falsity content. Popper’s concept of ‘veri-
similitude’ was doomed to failure (Miller, 1974; Tichy, 
1974), but one aspect – its link to ‘degree of corrobo-
ration’ – remains worth exploring. Remember that 
Popper denied all possibility of inductive inference; 
he also denied that any scientific theory (defined as a 
universal statement) could ever be known to be true 
– it can only be known to be false. From there results 
Popper’s extreme skepticism. A Popperian standing on 
the top of the Eiffel Tower has no positive argument 
why he should take the stairs down rather than jump 
off the tower in the expectation to gently glide to the 
ground (Worrall, 1989; see also Putnam, 1974). To 
claim that Galilei’s laws are highly corroborated, and 
that to take the stairs would therefore be a safer way 
down, makes an inference from the past performance 
of Galilei’s laws to their future performance. This is 
Popper’s closet inductivism. Popper (1974a: 1193, 
n.165b) admitted to “a ‘whiff ’ of inductivism” in his 
reasoning, which “enters … with the assumption that 
science can progress towards greater verisimilitude”. 
“On one meaning of the word ‘whiff ’ a whiff is ‘a 
kind of fish’, and certainly this kind of argument is 
fishy. On another construal ‘whiff ’ is a puff of air. But 
it is just false to say that there is a whiff of inductivism 
here – there is a full-blown storm” (Newton-Smith, 
1981 [1994: 68]). This shows that unless one adopts 
Popper’s extreme skepticism, his notion of ‘corrobora-
tion’ is hardly different “from what the inductivists 
mean when they say that a hypothesis has been con-
firmed” (Ayer, 1972 [2006: 74]).
Relevant Evidence in Systematics
Cladists by and large agree that Hennig’s (1950) 
criterion of monophyly marks out natural groups. 
The goal of cladistics is therefore a natural system 
(classification) of monophyletic clades (groups). Ac-
cording to Hempel (1965: 146), a ‘natural’ classifica-
tion is distinguished from an ‘artificial’ one by the 
fact that “those characteristics of the elements which 
serve as criteria of membership in a given class are 
associated, universally or with a high probability, 
with more or less extensive clusters of other charac-
teristics.” Hempel’s criterion of naturalness translates 
into character congruence in cladistic analysis. The 
‘coming together’ of (independent) characters in sup-
port of a hierarchy is what licenses the evolutionary 
Rieppel, O.: Hypothetico-Deductivism in Systematics268
explanation of that hierarchy. Hempel (1965: 352) 
based such ‘coming together’ of evidence on the “laws 
of coexistence”, as opposed to the “laws of succession”, 
thus embracing a “silence about causation” (Rosen-
berg, 2005: 32). The cause precedes its effect. Hume’s 
minimalist account reduced causation, i.e., the rela-
tion of cause to effect, to temporal precedence, spa-
tiotemporal contiguity, and constant conjunction. 
Hempel’s ‘law of coexistence’ is even more minimal-
ist, and hence abandons the need for causal relations 
in scientific explanations: “In particular, there is no 
requirement by Hempel that the premises must tell us 
anything about the cause of the event to be explained. 
Hempel is particularly insistent on this point” (Ru-
ben, 1993: 4). An effect follows a cause, but in con-
trast to Hempel’s ‘law of succession’, his ‘law of coex-
istence’ has no temporal dimension. This opens the 
door to an instrumentalist perspective in systematics 
(Rieppel, 2007).
A scientific realist argues that scientific theories 
are approximately relevantly true, i.e., approximate 
the world as it really is, outside of mind and discourse. 
Airplanes don’t crash because our laws of aerodynam-
ics are approximately relevantly true. And should an 
airplane crash, the cause of the accident can be inves-
tigated, and many times identified. Instrumentalists 
argue that scientific theories do not make such onto-
logical commitments to the world, or if they do, that 
this is an excess content that the theory can shed with-
out harm. For an instrumentalist, a scientific theory 
is not approximately relevantly true, but empirically 
adequate (van Fraassen, 1980). Its empirical adequacy 
is measured by its predictive power. But as Hennig 
(1974) realized already, predictiveness is not a prop-
erty that characterizes systematic theories, certainly 
not in terms of the D-N model (its premises includ-
ing a universal law), nor in terms of the I-S model 
(its premises including a statistical law) of scientific 
explanation. Accordingly, cladists evaluate hypotheses 
of phylogenetic relationships not in terms of their pre-
dictiveness, but in terms of their explanatory power: 
the ‘coming together’ of characters, i.e., character 
congruence, is explained in terms of homology, i.e., 
common descent. Cladistic analysis organizes data, 
whatever these are, in an optimal way relative to some 
optimality criterion, such as parsimony, and then pro-
ceeds to dress up the resulting tree as an estimate of 
phylogenetic relationships: the “most parsimonious 
trees are trees on which the greatest amount of puta-
tive homology statements … can be explained as due 
to inheritance and common descent, and such trees 
are the best available phylogenetic hypotheses for the 
terminals at hand, whether or not the individual simi-
larity statements or their explanations are historically 
correct” (De Leat, 2005, p. 88).
But what does it mean to characterize the cor-
rectness of the historical explanation of character 
statements as irrelevant? Bertrand & Härlin (2008: 
339) characterize the realist claim of a growing cor-
respondence of phylogenetic hypotheses to “the real 
phylogeny” as an “admirable but nevertheless a very 
idealistic picture of taxonomy.” They go on to assert 
that “while phylogeny is an evolutionary process, tax-
onomy is a human activity … our reconstructions and 
representations have a profound influence on how we 
talk and think about the true phylogeny” (Bertrand 
& Härlin, 2008: 340). Human thought and dis-
course thus reconstructs and represents – at least in 
part – the scientific reality of the taxonomist3. And 
indeed, if there is no theory-free observation, charac-
ter statements are low-level hypotheses, which have to 
be evaluated by the scientific community engaged in 
systematics. What does it mean, then, to say that “no 
special procedure is required for [character] hypoth-
esis ‘generation’” (Wheeler et al., 2006: 10)? How is 
it possible, on that basis, to distinguish total evidence 
from relevant evidence, if such a distinction is required 
for sound inductive (abductive) inference? In his dis-
cussion of the requirement of total evidence, Salmon 
(1998: 340) recognized that requirement as a way to 
ensure that the inductive inference will be a strong 
one, yet qualified total evidence as a requirement for 
all relevant evidence, i.e., evidence “of an appropriate 
sort” (Salmon, 1998: 305).
The mere ‘coming together’ of character state-
ments is not enough to demonstrate their relevance 
(Lecointre & Deleporte, 2005). The mere congru-
ence of characters is too week to show that the char-
acters are ‘of an appropriate sort’, especially not if the 
‘correctness’ of ‘individual similarity statements’ is 
considered irrelevant (De Leat, 2005), or a method 
for the generation of character statements is denied 
(Wheeler et al., 2006). Similarity, it is often said, is 
in the eye of the beholder. Indeed: pigs and oysters 
share a similarity, i.e., they are not eaten by orthodox 
Jews (Sterelny & Griffiths, 1999). Should this similar-
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3. Consider the traditional notion of a ‘natural kind’ as a sample of stuff, or a collection (or aggregate) of things that occur in nature and that, 
in virtue of shared causal dispositions, exhibit lawful behavior at least to some degree (e.g., Griffiths, 1999). Bertand and Härlin (2008: 
343) contrast this traditional conception of natural kinds with their own version of natural kinds as “sets of phylogenetic hypotheses.” 
This must mean that phylogenetic hypotheses – qua tokens of a natural kind – constitute the taxonomist’s reality.
ity even be considered as a potential homology of pigs 
and oysters, or should such a character statement be 
rejected outright? Evidently, it could be conjectured as 
a possible homology statement, but it won’t stand the 
test of congruence. So there is no way around the fact 
that the test of congruence is a necessary condition for 
cladistic analysis (Fitzhugh, 2006a, 2006b; Kearney 
& Rieppel, 2006). But it is not also a condition suf-
ficient for the distinction of relevant evidence from all 
total evidence potentially available. What in addition 
is required is a causal grounding of character state-
ments in theories of inheritance, development, and 
function.
Causal relations imply reality: it is hard to imag-
ine things that do not exist to enter into causal re-
lations. The ‘law of coexistence’ may remain silent 
about causality, character analysis cannot. To be rel-
evant for phylogenetic analysis, character statements 
have to convey information relevant to that project, 
information of the right sort for that project. Charac-
ter statements gain that information content through 
their causal grounding in theories of inheritance, de-
velopment, and function. Such causal grounding may 
be direct, as through the investigation of the develop-
mental mechanisms at work in a tetrapod limb bud, 
or indirect through the application of criteria of to-
pology and connectivity that are themselves grounded 
in ontogeny. According to Platnick (1982: 283) “one 
needs no causal theory to observe that of all the mil-
lions of species of organisms in the world, only about 
5,000 of them have abdominal spinnerets.” This is 
evidently wrong: the character ‘spinnerets’ is causally 
grounded through its function – it’s a spider’s silk-
spinning organ. This organ is located in the abdomen, 
which is identified through its topology and connec-
tivity as determined by the embryonic development 
of the spider, etc.
The same argument applies to molecular data. 
Their causal grounding requires to take into account 
what is known of DNA function and sequence evolu-
tion, even if such knowledge still remains relatively 
limited, yet is complex (e.g., Philippe et al., 2005). 
Vertebrate paleontologists are not willing to disregard 
all the evidence provided by fossils for the origin of 
mammals in order to maintain putative homologies 
that render mammals the sister-group of birds. The 
fossil record, and its interpretation from a morpho-
logical, developmental, and functional perspective, 
played an enormous role in segregating relevant from 
irrelevant evidence for the sister-group relationships 
of mammals (e.g., Kemp, 1983; Gauthier et al., 
1988; Kirsch & Mayer, 1998). A sister-group rela-
tionship of birds and mammals was postulated both 
on morphological (Gardiner, 1992, 1993) and mo-
lecular (Hedges et al., 1990) grounds. The inclusion 
of fossils in the analysis reverted those relationships 
and recovered the traditional Archosauria again, with 
birds being the sister-group of crocodiles amongst ex-
tant amniotes (Gauthier et al., 1988). Kemp (1988) 
optimized characters on the ancestral node of birds 
and mammals showing that the putative ancestor of 
Haemothermia would not have been a viable organ-
ism. Since endothermy was used as a putative syn-
apomorphy of birds and mammals (Gardiner, 1982), 
their most recent common ancestor would have to 
have been endothermic. And yet, this organism could 
not have had body insulation, since hair and feath-
ers have radically divergent ontogenetic trajectories 
and therefore are considered to be non-homologous. 
Why should molecular systematists disregard concern 
for the complexities of life? Nucleotides per se may 
lack the structural or developmental complexity that 
are exhibited by morphological systems (Frost et al., 
2006: 14), but that does not speak to the complex-
ity of DNA function and sequence evolution. Pro-
ponents of direct optimization techniques (Wheeler 
et al., 2006) need to be concerned about the opti-
mization of DNA sequence data to ancestral nodes, 
and their biological relevance for such an ancestral 
condition.
cOncLuSIOnS
A review of covering law models of scientific ex-
planation (Popper’s falsificationism and the Hempel-
Oppenheim deductive-nomological model) shows 
that phylogenetic systematics (the cladistic analysis of 
phylogenetic relationships) is not hypothetico-deduc-
tively structured. If it were, there would be no reason 
to call for total evidence, since that requirement is 
automatically satisfied in a deductively structured 
explanation, where the explanans logically entails 
the explanandum. In fact, the appeal to the require-
ment of total evidence (Kluge, 1989, 2004) indicates 
that phylogenetic inference based on the principles 
of cladistic analysis is inductively, or abductively, 
structured (Fitzhugh, 1997. 2006a, 2006b, 2008). 
The principle of total evidence has been invoked to 
render inductive inference an argument as strong as 
it can be, but for this to be the case the total evidence 
must also be relevant evidence, i.e., evidence of the 
right sort (Salmon, 1998). Character congruence is 
a necessary condition for phylogenetic inference, but 
not also a sufficient condition. What is required in 
addition is the causal grounding of character state-
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ments in theories of inheritance, development and 
function. Homology is a relation; homologues are 
parts of organisms entering into this relation. To call 
parts of organisms homologous means to reify (i.e., to 
turn a concept into a thing) the relation of homology. 
The way to do so is through causal grounding (Riep-
pel & Kearney, 2007): causal relations are existence 
implying.
It is often said that such causal grounding can go 
wrong: why should ontogeny provide causal ground-
ing for character statements, when ontogeny itself can 
change and evolve? Enough examples are known of 
putatively homologous features that share different 
ontogenetic trajectories, or putatively non-homolo-
gous features which share a similar ontogenetic trajec-
tory (Hall, 1995). True enough – but the trick here 
is not to set the bar of knowledge impossibly high. 
That scientists are prone to make mistakes is no rea-
son to reject theories of inheritance, development, 
and function in character analysis. Once hypothetico-
deductivism is left behind, certainty and necessity are 
no longer issues in scientific reasoning. Their place is 
taken by probability.
RESuMO
A sistemática filogenética (ou análise cladística das 
relações filogenéticas) não é estruturada de uma maneira 
hipotético-dedutiva (no sentido de um modelo de lei 
de explanação científica abrangente). Se esta fosse, não 
haveria razão de apelar para o princípio de evidência 
total, já que este requisito encontra-se automaticamente 
preenchido em uma explanação estruturada de forma 
dedutiva. Alternativamente, a demanda pelo requisito 
de evidência total na sistemática filogenética indica que 
a inferência filogenética é estruturada de forma indutiva 
ou até mesmo abdutiva. O princípio de evidência total 
foi invocado no sentido de transformar a inferência 
indutiva em sistemática em um argumento tão forte 
quanto possível, mas para que isto ocorra o princípio 
de evidencia total deve representar também evidência 
relevante, isto é evidência “do tipo certo” em relação ao 
assunto a ser esclarecido. A congruência de caracteres 
constitui-se em uma condição necessária à inferência 
filogenética, mas não deve ser vista como uma condição 
suficiente para esta última. O que parece faltar é uma 
base causal na definição de caracteres em teorias de 
herdabilidade, desenvolvimento e função.
Palavras-Chave: Hempel, Popper, cladística, 
hipotético-dedutivismo, evidência total, evidência 
relevante.
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